Moral and Character Education by Thoma, Stephen & Walker, David Ian
Citation: Thoma, Stephen and Walker, David Ian (2017) Moral and Character Education. The 
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Education. 
Published by: Oxford University Press
URL:  https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264093.013... 
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264093.013.119>
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/31893/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to 
access the University’s research output. Copyright ©  and moral rights for items on NRL are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items 
can be reproduced,  displayed or  performed,  and given to third parties in  any format  or 
medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior 
permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as 
well  as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page.  The content must  not  be 
changed in any way. Full  items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium 
without  formal  permission  of  the  copyright  holder.   The  full  policy  is  available  online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been 
made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the 





D I Walker & S Thoma 
 
Moral and character education 
At core, moral and character education aims to develop the moral person.  How this end state 
develops has been hindered by interest from different theoretical positions, differences between 
practitioners and theoreticians, different assumptions about how far character is educable and 
associated measurement problems.  Traditionally moral education is concerned with the 
interpretation and strategies one uses to understand moral phenomenon and defines the moral 
person as a predominantly thinking entity, whereas character education emphasises the 
development of habits and dispositions as a precondition for the moral person.  Current interest is in 
finding commonalities across these traditions towards the achievement of human flourishing.  These 
points of intersection have often been overlooked, but current work is demonstrating the 
importance of interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary  approaches for practitioners, researchers and 
policy makers.  
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Historically, questions about the development of the moral person have been underpinned by two 
fundamentally different and often opposing perspectives – those that emphasise the direct 
cultivation of habits, dispositions and virtues and those that emphasize cognitive features, especially 
moral reasoning and judgement.  In simple terms, this conflict reflects a basic historical difference 
between character and moral education, although the distinction between these two traditions is 
becoming much more difficult to maintain as a consequence of advances in these and other areas.   
Contemporary attempts to understand and explain the moral person and how character develops is 
obviously complex and involves a multitude of ideas and approaches from a range of academic 
disciplines, representing significant advances beyond this basic dichotomy. Indeed, this complexity 
has only increased in recent years as interest in moral phenomena has expanded to traditions and 
constructs not traditionally associated with moral and character education.   In this article, we set 
out and discuss these often conflicting contributions and take the view that although there is a 
tendency for traditions to be viewed as confrontational there are important and valuable points of 
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intersection that collectively advance our understanding of what is the moral person and how this 
might best be realised while also addressing the many impediments for working out how to bring 
about the moral person. In the closing section of the paper we reflect on these exciting new 
advances in the fields of moral and character education and suggest that multidisciplinary and 
interdisciplinary approaches are necessary for practitioners, researchers and policy makers alike. 
The longstanding interest in what constitutes a moral person is reflected in the many and varied 
theoretical positions used to define its central features.   In a recent review of the last 40 years of 
research in moral education, Lee and Taylor [1] found almost all of the dominant psychological 
traditions represented with increasing diversity in more recent times.  Not surprisingly, proponents 
of historically oppositional approaches have proposed many different and conflicting definitions and 
methods leading to the confusion best captured by the ‘Tower of Babel’ analogy that Marvin 
Berkowitz [2, p247] often applies to the area.  In this article, we identify five broad traditions for 
discussion and these encompass perspectives on the moral person that have at the centre of their 
enquiries: moral identity, emotions, positive character strengths, in addition to those traditions that 
emphasise virtue and cognition.      
Tendency for traditions to be viewed as confrontational  
Virtue-based character education 
As the earliest kind of education for character, virtue based approaches are a good place to start.  
Sometimes these have been referred to as socialisation methods because children are said to 
acquire an understanding of the virtues and dispositional habits through a growing understanding of 
social norms and cultural traditions [3].  Education for character by direct and authoritative means 
was common place from the time of Plato and Aristotle until the early Enlightenment.    This so 
called ‘golden period’ was legitimised  by faith in the existence of an objective human essence and 
telos, a faith that came under serious challenge in the Enlightenment period by David Hume and 
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others with their assertions that morality amounted to nothing more than personal choice.  Even so, 
this kind of character education was not significantly interrupted in practice until much later – an 
interruption that was a consequence of increased questioning about the possibility of moral truth as 
depicted in Alasdair MacIntyre’s ‘After Virtue’ [4], especially connected with a general demise in the 
dominance of moral philosophy and of religious authority.  
In subsequent centuries, a range of alternative canonical paradigms were ushered in to replace this 
lost trust in moral truth and to support various forms of character education [5].   These have 
motivated an assortment of paradigms over the years such as, for example, assumptions in the 18th 
Century that children were originally sinful motivating approaches to character education that were 
basically in the shape of corrective discipline and strict religious development.  This contrasts with 
the 21st Century where there has been a detectable shift - at least in the academic community - 
towards the view that the rightful purpose of education is to create the conditions for children to 
flourish.  Emphasis on the pursuit of the flourishing student in education has gained significant 
traction in modern times as a consequence of a resurgence of virtue ethics in moral philosophy, a 
resurgence of Aristotelianism in educational philosophy and a shift in psychology towards positive 
rather than disease models of human functioning.  World War II was also a key historical point for 
character education after which the belief that schools could develop character  diminished because 
of fears that history might repeat itself if moral relativism were to take hold [6, chapter 2].  It was 
against this backdrop that Kohlberg’s theory [7] of moral development prevailed with its dominant 
rationalism and anti-relativist motivation - more of this later.   
Virtue-based character education is underpinned by the broad view that moral character is 
‘understood to encompass the evaluable, reason-responsive and educable sub-set of the human 
personality, and the virtues are seen as the main vehicles of that sub-set: more specifically, as 
settled states of character’ [5, p81].  This is generally associated with educational methods of role 
modelling, direct teaching and service learning etc.  Character involves being a certain kind of person 
4 
 
and is not reducible to an act [8, p2].  Although character is irreducibly ‘moral’ [9, p2], character 
education nevertheless encompasses the development of some traits that are not of themselves 
moral such as perseverance and self-discipline for example [8, p28/9].  Virtue based character 
education is commonly inspired by virtue ethics and has been criticised, most noticeably in the form 
of challenges to its underpinning claims to moral truth and for being politically conservative, 
individualistic and religious [however, see: 10].  
 A tension is also perceptible between versions of character education that are theory-based and 
those that are more concerned with behaviour or bringing about appropriately motivated moral 
people [11].  Earliest versions of character education ought to be contrasted with the emergence in 
the United States in the 1990s of a rather more pragmatic effort to alter children’s behaviour in 
response to widespread perception that society was undergoing a moral crisis [12].  Currently, virtue 
based character education is in ascendance in both theory and practice and this is evident in UK at 
the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues at the University of Birmingham where researchers, 
philosophers and educators are employed to advance a predominantly Aristotelian approach to 
character education, including the creation of specific school interventions.  For character educators, 
virtue typically comprises a unique set of emotion, reason, attention and conduct and these learned 
qualities, are constitutive of human flourishing and have multifaceted expression in perception, 
feeling, thought and action [9].  The intention to deliberately cultivate these dispositional human 
qualities by a range of direct and indirect means - typically seen as the hallmark of character 
education - is sometimes a point of denigration since for critics this raises important questions about 
who decides on the content for socialisation and teaching.   
Reason- based Moral Education 
Concerns about the limitations of character education framed around the transmission of cultural 
norms came to a head following the Second World War.  Critics noted the misuse of socialization 
practices to promote morally indefensible values and conceptions of the moral person [13]. 
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Influenced by Piaget [14] and emphasized by Kohlberg, socialisation theories failed because 
communities were essentially pluralistic in nature, thus problematizing the direct cultivation of 
virtue in children because different traditions might define the virtues differently.   In Kohlberg’s 
view this problem of moral relativism was the result of a socialisation view of character untethered 
to universal principles.   Only when the focus shifted to universal principles, he argued,  could one 
determine the legitimacy of competing moral claims and help us untangle, for instance how 
responsibility, loyalty, courage, as evidenced in the service of National Socialist Germany was never 
defensible even if supported by the culture [Kohlberg referred to a 'bag of virtues' in this context, 
13]. The power of these arguments in the late 1950s through the 1970s dominated moral education 
and suggested that increasingly sophisticated rational moral thinking was the best means for 
cultivating moral personhood.  Additionally, the Kohlbergian view advocated the importance of 
democratic environments (see Just Community as a later development in Kohlberg’s work, 
incorporating more of Durkheim’s ideas) as the mechanism to develop advanced moral thinking.  In 
these environments, children should be treated as equal agents rather than subordinate moral 
learners who were subject to directive adult socialisation.  Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental 
approach described individual moral improvement by passing through various stages of moral 
reasoning (there were six stages in his original theory).  His conception of moral stages connected 
the work of the political philosopher Rawls [15] and Piaget [14].  More recently these stages have 
been superseded by neo-Kohlbergians in their revamped theories.  For instance, expanding their 
emphasis beyond moral judgement - a focus increasingly considered too narrow  [cf. 16] - some neo-
Kohlbergians have adopted a Four-Component Model [17] that defines a person’s moral functioning 
as comprising four components of moral sensitivity, motivation and action in addition to moral 
judgement.  Affective processes are to some extent incorporated into this model and an interaction 
between each of the four components is assumed.  Moral schemas are integral to this new 
theoretical direction where a shift from lower to more complex moral functioning can occur under 
the right circumstances, particularly in relation to tacit or non-conscious functioning.  Three possible 
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levels of moral schema are depicted: personal interest, maintaining norms and a post-conventional 
schema [see 18 and other papers for a full description].  Changes incorporated into neo-Kohlbergian 
perspectives on moral functioning - abandoning the orthodox stage model, adopting the four 
component model, and relying on schema theory - weaken the original rationality versus virtue 
dichotomy outlined in the introduction to this article in ways unimaginable in the 1950s.  The 
adoption of moral schema theory and its emphasis on tacit knowledge has also accomplished 
greater synergy with other traditions in social and personality psychology.   
Although Jim Rest [17] accentuated moral behaviour and the moral processes necessary for this to 
occur, he did not incorporate virtues or stable traits into his model, perhaps as a consequence of 
adopting a socio-cognitive understanding of personality that is not static across situations and is 
(within reason) influenced by contexts [19].  Even so, the Intermediate Concept approach [20] 
represents a further convergence between Kohlbergian rationalism and character-based takes on 
the development of the moral person.  As well as four component processes operating together and 
in interaction  [21], there are three more levels at work in the moral judgement component.  At the 
most general and abstract level are so called ‘bedrock’ schemas’ (referring for example to moral 
judgements made largely on the basis of self-interest), in contrast to a third level of ‘contextual 
norms’ (e.g. professional codes or specific guidance) which prescribe action in specific 
circumstances. Intermediate concepts are located between these two levels and are considered 
specific to daily life and are related to virtue-based concepts [18] such as for example honesty and 
courage.  This point of convergence between neo-Kohlbergian and neo-Aristotelian approaches was 
exploited in a research project about character among students, aged 14 and 15, in UK schools [22, 
23] and this is discussed again later in the paper as an example of how traditions may be combined. 
Moral Identity 
A third tradition - moral identity [24] - builds on the general psychological literature of selfhood and 
identity to accentuate how far a person takes moral issues as salient to who they are – to their 
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identity [25].  Unlike virtue and rationalist traditions, this alternative point of entry for considering 
the moral person uniquely prioritises the will of the agent to consciously follow, identify, pursue and 
achieve a moral course in life.  This focus requires perseverance, determination and integrity which 
is why theories of moral identity often prioritise self-regulatory mechanisms [26].  The study of 
moral identity has led to significant contributions in the field, especially in relation to moral 
motivation since it follows that a strong moral identity - a genuine personal commitment to a moral 
course in life - is likely to transfer into action [26, 27].  Moral motivation has proved particularly 
illusive from other perspectives, particularly when there is an overemphasis on moral judgment at 
the expense of action (Blasi [28] showed that advanced moral judgement cannot be assumed to 
sufficiently  predict moral action).  On the question of moral motivation, Lawrence Walker claims 
that ‘many extant theories (of moral behaviour) do not have a ready answer because they ignore or 
disparage the role of the self in moral functioning’ [29, p30].  However, others such as Aquino and 
Read promote a specific version of moral identity theory to argue that moral identity exists for a 
person as only one identity among other social identities and together these make up a person’s 
self-schema.  As these authors caution: ‘although moral reasoning and cognitive moral development 
are important variables for explaining moral behavior, they are only part of the story ‘ [26, p1425].  
This particular viewpoint is rooted in a trait-based conceptualization of personality that builds both 
on the cognitive-developmental model [7, 14] and a sociocognitive model [30].   
Relating to moral identity, promising advances are occurring for understanding moral motivation in a 
new area of research - the study of moral exemplars as extreme cases [27, 31-33] that is sometimes 
carried out under the auspices of moral personality theory [34, 35].  The general notion is that real 
examples of human moral excellence are investigated in a process of ‘reverse engineering’.  One 
early realisation for Colby and Damon [36, 37] is that morality isn’t only about doing good for others 
but it is also necessarily the ability to identify and implement strategies to achieve the desired social 
outcomes; a degree of personal satisfaction also transpires from moral exemplars’ community 
oriented actions.  This has become known as the joint benefit of agency and communion - a 
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‘fundamental motivational duality’ [29, p32].  According to this view, there is a plethora of ways to 
be a good person and for moral exemplars, moral concerns and self-interest can be integrated within 
the person and that this reconciliation of agency and communion develops over time, thus signifying 
individual moral maturing or moral progress.  Agency and communion are believed to come together 
from originally separate entities within the person (e.g. in a child or adolescent) and from the 
perspective of the reconciliation model [38], advanced forms of moral functioning will tend to 
encompass a conjoining of agency and communion.  Although sometimes antagonistic to trait based 
approaches, the research on moral identity, including moral exemplars, is not entirely incompatible.  
In terms of educating children morally, Frimer and Walker [38] note that adolescence is a sensitive 
period for the reconciliation of agency and communion and it is surely profitable to consider 
educational interventions targeting the development and integration of these personality 
characteristics.  However, it remains uncertain what can be done with this knowledge, not least 
because as Laspley and Stey [24] argue, new knowledge about moral identity emerged from the 
study of adults and their lives.  Nevertheless, these authors draw on the work of Blasi [39] to convey 
hope that ways to cultivate will, self-control and moral integrity in children can be achieved based on 
this kind of research. 
The Role of Emotions in Moral and Character Education 
If the ‘big two’ traditions for moral and character education have been virtue and rationalist 
perspectives, then another related facet concerns the extent to which emotion features in various 
explanations of moral development and behaviour [40].   It’s not so much that emotion is completely 
missing from traditions discussed so far, rather we are interested here in the place that emotion 
occupies in various interpretations and explanations of the moral person.  For example, in his book 
based on Aristotelian virtue ethics, ‘The Self and Its Emotions’, Kristjánsson [41] grants emotions an 
essential role in terms of their relationship with the self.  Similarly, neo-Kohlbergians also 
acknowledge affect as a component part of moral functioning.   
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These attempts to incorporate emotions in traditional models of moral functioning may not go far 
enough.  Recent attempts to address the role of emotions in moral and character education have 
advanced across a number of fronts.  One line of interest coincided with the publication of 
Goleman’s book on Emotional intelligence [42] and involved the amalgamation of a variety of 
research and practice efforts in this general area.  This amalgamation formed a new approach called, 
Social and Emotional Learning (SEL) [43] that sought educable outcomes, especially involving efforts 
to equip children with the skills they would need to cope with all aspects of their lives, not just in 
terms of their education.  Quite radically, this included the development in children of appropriate 
attitudes and beliefs necessary for making careful decisions relating to their health, their personal 
relationships and other difficult issues common to growing up in modern society.  SEL also aimed to 
help children negotiate and avoid a plethora of negative behaviours associated with troubled youth, 
including bullying and substance abuse for example.  Helping children to develop a competent skills 
base for life is the main aim of SEL which seeks to make improvements in five specific areas: 
cognitive, affective, behavioural, relationship skills and responsible decision making [44].  An obvious 
criticism, however, has been the realisation that social and emotional skills - as developed by SEL - 
may just as easily be put to poor as good ends.  
Although a serious criticism, it is one that is being addressed.  In an inspiring chapter, Elias and 
colleagues [45] make a strong case for convergence between SEL and character and moral education 
approaches.  In this auspicious move, they prioritise systemic socialisation in schools whereby social, 
emotional and other skills are viewed as being optimally developed within an ecology or system of 
socialisation.   This approach takes us beyond the confines of specific educational programmes and 
interventions and foregrounds the school as an ecological environment in which the ways that 
children are treated across time matters (much in the same way Kohlberg and his colleagues viewed 
schools as optimally just communities).  Children need to ‘live’ their social, emotional, character and 
moral education in an appropriate environment and within this context education can offer children 
a variety of specific experiences.  Important questions still arise in terms of sources of moral 
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authority, but nevertheless this contribution from Elias et al represents an exciting synergy of theory 
and methods, especially it’s conjoining of the practically savvy knowledge and experience of SEL with 
other moral components.    
Of course, the rightful place of emotions in character and moral education cannot be mentioned 
without acknowledging Jonathan Haidt’s radical attack on rationalism [46].  Emotions not reasons 
are for Haidt the main act. His Social Intuitionist Model grants intuitive primacy to emotions in a self-
proclaimed ‘new synthesis’ of hard sentimentalism and social intuitionism.  In doing this, Haidt also 
integrates the view that (slower) reasoning is secondary to (faster, automatic and affect-laden) 
intuition [47] – this is a provocative and intriguing claim that has attracted a lot of interest.  Haidt 
maintains, too, that dominant social and cultural processes influence individual reasoning which is - 
to some extent at least - an activity done by communities, working across people rather simply 
within them, individually.  From this perspective, strong moral emotions such as contempt, anger 
and disgust are instant and explained or justified rationally in hindsight.   
Although one might argue that Haidt’s position is a needed corrective to the overemphasis on 
cognition the application to educational practice is unclear.  More helpful, are attempts to 
incorporate emotion within current models.  For instance, Kristjánsson [48] argues that in 
Aristotelian virtue ethics there is a soft rationalist rather than hard sentimentalist solution for the 
treatment of emotions in understanding the moral person.  The appropriate incorporation of 
emotion into our understanding of the moral person is imperative and good progress is being made 
in this respect, taking the field beyond crude polarised distinctions between emotion and rational 
thinking as if they are isolated human entities.   
Positive Psychology and human flourishing 
Also active in the pursuit of human flourishing for youth are positive psychologists [e.g. 49, 50].  
After World War II, however, a focus on the factors promoting positive outcomes was not something 
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of direct interest to psychology as a discipline which was then preoccupied with a disease model 
where various human troubles and pathologies rather than human flourishing per se occupied their 
time.  Marty Seligman is usually credited with motivating this shift towards a positive psychology 
that in the beginning based itself on authentic happiness theory but has more lately adopted well-
being theory [49]. A central idea for positive psychology is that each person has a unique suite of 
skills and character strengths, the positive expression of which is constitutive of that individuals 
flourishing.  The central concern, for positive psychology, therefore, is the identification and 
cultivation of a person’s strongest personal qualities or character strengths.  This ‘build and grow’ 
approach - not dissimilar from 1960’s humanist approaches of Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers - is 
often also connected with a vast literature on resilience.  Strengths of ‘grit’, determination and 
perseverance are unfortunately frequently advocated in instrumental ways as personal routes to 
improved levels of educational and other kinds of achievement [51].  While the need for 
determination and perseverance as second order virtues (i.e., serve to promote more central 
components of character) is obvious, these are nevertheless the sort of personal qualities that can 
easily fail the same test as emotional intelligence [42] – in other words, these are strengths of 
character that can be put to both good and poor ends.  Another problem for positive psychology and 
its quest to find and reinforce personal signature strengths is that many different personal strengths 
are needed in life and the negotiation of complicated moral situations often requires a sophisticated 
and sensitive overarching mechanism or adjudicator known to virtue ethicists as practical wisdom or 
phronesis [9].  Another, recent emergence in psychology is the positive youth development 
perspective.  This was not linked to the rise of positive psychology and in taking a person centred 
(rather than variable centred) approach is concerned with relations between individuals and their 
contexts, especially adaptive development among youth [52, 53].  This work is especially noteworthy 
for its emphasis on the complex interplay between the development of youth and their contexts. 
Impediments to working out how to achieve the goal of bringing about the moral person 
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The inherently interdisciplinary nature of moral and character education [8] is a strength and 
weakness, although as we will discuss it is not yet interdisciplinary enough. As we mentioned in the 
introduction, differences in traditions and associated definitional language have been an 
impediment to models and methods that capture the interdisciplinary / multidisciplinary nature of 
character and what constitutes effective moral education [54].   For many, working through the 
communalities and incompatibilities is unlikely to be profitable in the near term.  For instance, 
Berkowitz, a leading theorist in the field, generally tries to sidestep the problem by ‘get(ting) down 
to the business of fostering the development of character in youth’. [2, p248].   
Although we arrive at a more optimistic view of the utility in engaging the field’s diversity, it is 
important to highlight some additional impediments to the process of integration.  For example, at 
contextual and political levels there are obstacles for working out the goal of bringing about the 
moral person.  Sociologist, James Hunter [55, p15] argues that ‘character is as much a function of the 
social order as it is a manifestation of the individual person’ and he goes on to emphasise the social 
constitution of morality.  Abend [56, p164], too, calls for the empirical study of morality to be done 
on an ‘equal footing’ by a much wider range of disciplines than are routinely involved at present.  He 
mentions history, anthropology and sociology as disciplines that are likely to address cultural, 
institutional and historical factors.  Of course once the focus shifts to context, then political 
dimensions come into sharp relief.  One persisting charge against character education is that it 
supports the political status quo by emphasising individual levels of analysis rather than those of the 
group or community – features of obvious interest to the disciplines of sociology and political 
science.  To be sure, rationality and virtue traditions have often been politically polarised between 
liberalism and conservativism respectively, and others argue that character education is plagued by 
a too narrow view of the political that does not instil in children the notion that they can change the 
political order by collective action when this is needed for the moral good to prevail [57, 58].    Sayer 
[59, p5], makes a similar argument: ‘Ignoring racism, sexism, domination, exploitation, etc., and 
restricting ourselves to courage, gratitude, compassion, etc., renders philosophy voluntarist, gentile, 
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apolitical and ineffectual, though as we shall see, all the more politically useful for that’.  Aristotelian 
scholars might point out that Aristotle’s work can only be fully grasped when both his ‘Politics’  [60] 
and ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ [61] are read together with the former book contributing a necessary 
political dimension to the Nicomachean Ethics, but unfortunately the latter work has dominance in 
the moral and character education literature to the detriment of recognising the need for an 
appropriate political society and context within which human flourishing can occur.    
Often there is an accompanying confusion between situations and contexts in the literature with the 
real effects of ongoing contextual factors being confused with isolated and sometimes extreme 
situations.  For example, arguments abound about the extent to which social situations matter 
versus persisting traits of character [e.g. 62, 63, 64]. Experimental conditions generally inform 
situationist arguments by exposing participating individuals to manufactured circumstances and 
observing their reactions.  When, in high numbers, participants respond poorly (for example, by 
picking up money from the floor), this is interpreted as confirming the dominance of a social 
situation over persisting character traits.   The trouble is that these methods cannot provide clarity 
about the role of situations versus character.  For one thing, the manufactured situations can be 
extreme, beyond ordinary experiences in the context of a person’s character and life.  Moreover, 
contextually relevant reasons for acting are just as important (e.g. for virtue ethics and neo-
Kohlbergian traditions) as actual behaviour (the emphasis of the experiments), and this cannot be 
accounted for using these sorts of experimental methods.  Finally, arguing for the possibility of trait 
based character that persists over time and context is not the same as claiming that good moral 
character of this kind commonly exists in populations since as theories about the development of 
moral character show, this is a hard won and potentially even quite a rare eventuality  [cf 9].             
 
In addition to impediments at the broad conceptual level, differences in theoretical perspectives for 
understanding and bringing about the moral person lead rather inevitably to alternative views on a 
number of key areas that are crucial for making progress towards this goal.  There is not sufficient 
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space to cover all of these here, but among the most challenging contradictions and impediments to 
progress are those relating to matters of development and how progress may be assessed or proven 
– in other words matters of measurement.   
 
The role of development 
 
The demise of a clear stage based cognitive developmental approach [7] has left a degree of 
uncertainty about the question of change and continuities in moral and character across 
development , although there are many reasons to believe that the sorts of moral and character 
education needed differs by age.  For instance, evidence from other related constructs within the 
social and personality developmental areas [65-67] as well as cognitive and motivational traditions, 
indicate the need to incorporate developmental factors in any comprehensive treatment of 
character and moral functioning.  Indeed what may be needed is a more expanded developmental 
focus and in particular in younger populations where traditional moral developmental theories have 
not been emphasized.   Recent work in domain theory [68] and during infancy [69] support a 
broader lens.  
 
 The fundamental role of measurements  
 
In terms of moral and character development in the school context, what precisely should be 
assessed and why?  Should we measure the impact of individual lessons or interventions in pre and 
post-test assessments; or should we be interested in self-reported improvements for various 
character strengths, especially grit, determination or perseverance towards levels of school 
attainment.  Alternatively, do we instead want to know about objective expressions and changes in 
virtue among children, not only in behavioural or instrumental terms but in regard to their 
appropriate moral reactions, their feelings and perceptions or their hexis?  Should we take the view 
that developing virtue in children is inherently valuable in its own right or is it necessarily connected 
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to certain educational outcomes?  Is it really acceptable to make assessments about children’s 
characters at all and should this be a private matter beyond the concern of educational 
establishments?    When Kohlberg’s theory of moral development was dominant, a focus on 
education and its role in moral development was clear, supported by reliable instruments for 
assessing progress.  The theory also guided the design of school interventions and informed what 
should reasonably be included under the remit of moral education.  The demise of the Kohlbergian 
theoretical paradigm has, in many respects, left a void, including various challenges associated with 
measurement or assessment.  In simple terms, existing points of entry for understanding the moral 
person often rely on their own favoured methods of assessment with assessments sometimes being 
made without reference to clear theoretical or developmental underpinnings.   Berkowitz and Bier 
[70] make a related argument concerning the implementation in schools of various interventions,  
when they state that even well-conceived and theoretically grounded interventions can be 
unrecognisable (from each other and from their original intentions) when they are put into practice 
as a consequence of a plethora of local factors in the daily reality of schools, rendering realistic 
comparisons difficult.   
 
As mentioned, some traditions and researchers seem wedded to certain default methods.  Positive 
psychologists, for instance, often favour self-report measures such as the Values-in-Action (VIA) 
Inventory of Strengths for Youth [50, 71].  These surveys use four or eight questions to assess each 
of the 24 character strengths (the entire range of VIA surveys is being reviewed [e.g. 72]).   Others 
complain that self-report methods are insufficient [9, chapter 3], pointing to problems of self-realism 
whereby an individual might be thoroughly deluded about the kind of person they are.  There are 
also possible problems of desirability bias, although large samples can to some extent mitigate these 
weaknesses.  To virtue ethicists, the real focus ought to be changes of meaning within the person [9, 
p62] which makes for a very difficult measurement task.  For example, the assessment of progress 
for a class on a particular intervention cannot account for each child’s unique needs and responses 
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in the context of their lives, their progress to date and the natural virtue they may possess.  In trying 
to overcome some of these problems and capitalise on the strengths and synergies within and 
between traditions, we argue that the best way forward is a multimethod approach [see 22 for an 
example of this] as probably the only possible way to understand and assess moral and character 
development, although of course this does not resolve the problem of a missing psychological 
developmental theory.  As mentioned earlier, a study at the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues 
combined Neo-Kohlbergian and virtue ethics traditions in a multimethod study of character 
education in UK schools.  The dominant method used was a survey incorporating moral dilemmas 
created by Thoma in the Intermediate Concept (IC) tradition [73].  Participants read about a realistic 
scenario and decide what the protagonist should do and why.  This IC approach began in the 
professions (e.g. dentistry) and builds on the idea that a group of professionals can generally reach 
agreement about appropriate responses to typical real life situations (reflected in the dilemmas) as 
well as in respect of reasons or justifications for acting.  This expertise has been translated more 
generally to adolescents by Thoma et al in the ICM Adolescent [18], to provide a measure of the 
application of virtue-like concepts to real life situations from adolescent life.  In the spirit of 
triangulation, the same study also included student self-report measures (VIA Youth survey), teacher 
interviews and reports by teachers on the pupils as a group.   
 
 
Finding points of intersection and new advances 
Now that five broad traditions and various impediments for understanding the moral person have 
been discussed, we need to define what triumph for character and moral education might look like 
and work out how far towards that goal has been travelled and what more needs to be done?  
Inevitably, any definition of success in character and moral education should reflect ‘real world’ 
progress in bringing about the development of the moral person.  Ideally, we believe that eventually 
in this vision of success the following might be included: an accepted underpinning theory (ies) of 
moral development; a level of consensus about what is morally educable; at least some agreement 
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about the educable content for moral and character education and its pedagogy (allowing for 
cultural differences); the availability of a range of trusted research instruments for assessing 
progress among groups, schools and for various educational interventions; a shared language and 
due recognition and account of contextual influences or cultural and institutional presuppositions  
[56]. In the same spirit, Kristjánsson reflecting on the real practical progress for moral/character 
education [9] concluded that four conditions need to be satisfied in order for any particular moral or 
character educational paradigm to take hold.  In brief, these are: (1) A resonance with the concerns 
and anxieties of the general public; (2) A reasonably broad political consensus from both ‘left’ and 
‘right’; (3) A philosophical theory that underpins the proposed approach -  especially one that 
provides a ‘stable methodological, ontological, epistemological and moral basis.’ [9, p147]; (4) and, 
finally a prevailing psychological theory is needed that underpins the approach, connecting 
psychology to educational theory in a way that is possible.  Success on all four counts was achieved 
during the period of Kohlbergian rationalism, but now in the 21st Century, Kristjánsson assessed his 
own preferred Aristotelian character education approach against these criteria to consider its 
chances of gaining  ‘taxonomic bite’ [74] in current policy and educational terms.  He concluded that 
the absence of a prevailing psychological theory is its downfall and so only three out of four of these 
conditions were met. 
In the light of this discussion, we shall focus in this next section on encouraging points of intersection 
towards this goal.  In taking this approach to a wide and varied field of study, children’s fundamental 
need for high levels of basic care and attachment stands out as an obvious point of intersection even 
if it is not always explicitly acknowledged.  Clearly, infants and children require rudiments of care 
and attachment in order for moral development to successfully occur.  As developed in attachment 
theory [75, 76] this fundamental relationship helps to bind to the self to many of the characteristics 
and predispositions that serve character development throughout the lifespan.   Empirical evidence 
suggests secure attachment characterized by parental availability and positive emotional responses 
help the infant to develop self-regulation - a characteristic that positive psychologists later define as 
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grit in children; a positive view of human availability—an orientation that may influence a later 
sensitivity to psychological communion and an interest in justice and fairness as well as a positive 
emotional reaction to human exchange.  In short, a full model of the moral person must incorporate 
these fundamental building blocks of character and how they influence and become understood by 
the developing child.  We know that the quality and consistency of close relationships influence the 
extent and ways in which the infant feels (in)secure.  Sayer finds it incredulous that attachment 
theory is omitted from most accounts of character and moral education.  After all, as he goes on to 
say, ‘our sense of self also depends on our pre-linguistic and subsequent experience of being held, 
loved, played with, celebrated, rather than ignored, disliked, hurt, shamed, etc.’  [59, p11].  Sound 
attachments as babies, infants and adolescents generate hopeful possibilities for the cultivation of 
the moral person.  After all, a child who learns to be wary, suspicious and anxious as a consequence 
of poor basic care and an absence of secure and loving relationships will have a hard time learning 
empathy, justice and care for others [77].   These important lessons of attachment theory should 
motivate a vital point of intersection for any attempt to develop children morally.   
Narvaez and Lapsley [78] have also worked on a holistic and comprehensive passage for cultivating 
the moral person.   In the Integrative Ethical Education model (IEE) they bring together many of the 
strands already discussed in this article. As a programme of ethical character development, IEE is 
intended for all age groups mostly in educational settings but also in the home.  Reassuringly, IEE 
also stresses as fundamental,   (1) the importance of caring adult relationships with the child and 
goes on to emphasise four more key factors which are: (2) a climate to support excellent 
achievement and ethical character; (3) efforts by adults to foster ethical skills across activities; (4) 
the encouragement of self-authorship / regulation and (5) that the adults work to build a 
community.  The authors connect this model with an exciting new development in the field, namely 
neuroscience to assert three firm conclusions about moral development and moral action as it is 
embedded in contexts.  Based on the knowledge that experience shapes brain biases, they claim that 
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moral functioning is multivariate;  that moral identity may be the most influential predictor of moral 
behaviour (and motivation); and that moral experts are different to novices.   
Conclusion and Implications for research and practice 
The complexity of this necessarily multidisciplinary field cannot be overstated.  There is significant 
risk of applying an approach that is too narrow both to theoretical, empirical and research work as 
well as to practical interventions.  For example, we would highlight the narrow focus of positive 
psychology on the rather instrumental amoral emphasis on building a narrow range of character 
strengths in a vacuum.  By contrast we suggest that the merging of traditions as was done in the 
development of the ICM represents a more profitable approach for exploring character and moral 
education.  Additionally, there are trends in the broader field that have the potential to expand the 
empirical support for a broad-based model of character and moral functioning.  First, recent work in 
infancy, evolutionary psychology suggests normative predispositions in our interactions with others.  
How these building blocks of character intersect with the attachment relationship should provide 
insight into how character emerges as the self becomes organized in the social world.  Second, the 
limitations of his work notwithstanding, Haidt has correctly noted that emotions are an 
underappreciated contribution in our moral understandings.  Character education has focused on 
the cognitive and rational because of the historical focus on these constructs and because cognition 
is more amenable to educational interventions.  However, if emotions are influential there must be a 
place for it in our modelling of character and moral action.  Perhaps as measurements move away 
from traditional formats to incorporate advances in virtual real-time assessments the power of the 
intuitive and reactive will become more evident.  Third, there is a need to facilitate the 
interdisciplinarity we see as central to addressing the missing criteria Kristjánsson lays out in his 
evaluation of the current state of character education.  Too often, researchers in the various 
traditions linked to character and moral education have little to do with one another.  Each group 
has different professional homes, attends to different journals and rarely work together.  As we 
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move into the current climate where interdisciplinary and  multidisciplinary work is being 
encouraged by funding agencies, these  links may be easier to form.  However, until journal and 
other outlets welcome interdisciplinary work structural barriers to the developmental of integrative 
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